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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF CONTRACTS:
ARE JUDGMENTS INCLUDED?
The question of whether and when a judgment is to be con-
sidered a contract has arisen in many states and has been decided
with little uniformity.' Although the question presents three distinct
issues,2 this note will confine itself to a discussion of whether a judg-
ment is a contract in the constitutional sense. Both the Federal3 and
California4 Constitutions prohibit the state from enacting any law
which would impair the obligations of contracts. The problem to
i Those cases holding that a judgment is a contract are: Humphrey v.
Gerard, 83 Conn. 346, 77 A. 65 (1910); Heath v. Fennig; 219 Ind. 629, 40 N.E.
2d 329 (1942); Butler v. Bolinger, 16 La. App. 397, 133 So. 778 (1931); Morse
v. Toppan, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 411 (1855); Lohrstorfer v. Lohrstorfer, 140
Mich. 551, 104 N.W. 142 (1905); Board of President & Directors of St. Louis
Pub. Schools v. Estate of Broadway Say. Bank, 12 Mo. App. 104 (1882);
Bailey v. Great W. Oil, 32 N.M. 478, 259 P. 614 (1927); Gutta-Percha & Rubber
Mfg. Co. v. City of Houston, 108 N.Y. 276, 15 N.E. 402 (1888); Meyer v. Brooks,
29 Ore. 203, 44 P. 281 (1896); Sawyer v. Vilas, 19 Vt. 43 (1846); Marstiller v.
Ward, 52 W. Va. 74, 43 S.E. 178 (1903); Child v. Harris Mfg. Co., 68 Wis. 231,
32 N.W. 43 (1887).
Holding a judgment not to be a contract are: McAfee v. Covington, 71
Ga. 272 (1883); Hoehamer v. Village of Elmwood Park, 361 Ill. 422, 198 N.E.
345 (1935); Sprott v. Reid, 3 Greene 489 (Iowa 1852); Burnes v. Simpson, 9
Kan. 658 (1872); Bank of United States v. Dallam, 34 Ky. 574 (1836); Jordan
v. Robinson, 15 Me. 167 (1838); Olson v. Dahfl, 99 Minn. 433, 109 N.W. 1001
(1906); Stanford v. Coram, 28 Mont. 288, 72 P. 655 (1903); La Salle Extension
Univ. v. Barr, 19 N.J. Misc. 387, 20 A.2d 609. (1941); McDonald v. Dickson, 87
N.C. 373 (1882); Wakeman v. Peter, 52 Okla. 639, 152 P. 455 (1915); Ryan v.
Southern Mut. Bldg. & Loan, 50 S.C. 185, 27 S.E. 618 (1897); City of Sherman
v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13, 42 S.W. 961 (1897); Wyoming Natl Bank v. Brown,
7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291 (1898). The disparity of decisions on this question has
been recognized, but no attempt has been made to explain or reconcile them.
A. FREEMAN, JuDfmG NTs § 5 (5th ed. 1925).
2 The other two issues are (1) whether code provisions dealing with
"actions brought on contracts" include actions brought on judgments (e.g.,
CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 537(1)), and (2) whether state constitutional pro-
hibitions against imprisonment for nonpayment of debts include judgment
debts (e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 15). Since the three issues present separate
and distinct problems, an argument used to reach a conclusion as to one issue
would not necessarily support the same conclusion for another issue.
3 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10(1).
4 CAL. CoxsT. art. I, § 16. For the purpose of this note, it will be as-
sumed that the construction of the California Constitution is identical with
that of the Federal. The California cases which are seemingly in conflict
with the United States Supreme Court are not to be distinguished on the
ground that the California Constitution is being given a broader or more
inclusive interpretation. This assumption is justified by the similar wording
and spirit of both provisions. In addition, no holding or dicta in any Cali-
fornia decision is based on the ground that the California Constitution is being
interpreted differently from the Federal. Although "the Constitution" refers
to the Federal throughout this note, everything said in reference to it might
apply equally to the California provision. Compare Bronson v. Kinzie, 42
U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843), with Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524 (1852).
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be discussed here arises when the state enacts a law which impairs
the right of a party to collect a judgment rendered by a court of
law on some particular action. It must then be decided whether ajudgment is to be included in the term "contract" so that the impair-
ment of the obligation due under the judgment will also be pro-
hibited by the Constitution.
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a judg-
ment is not a contract in the constitutional sense,5 one California
decision has stated the contrary.6 This note will take the position
that the conflict is more illusory than actual and that the California
decision, when analyzed in conjunction with its cited authority, is in
full agreement with the views expressed by the United States Su-
preme Court. In support of this position it will be argued that (1)
the remedy available for enforcing a contractual obligation is part
of that obligation; (2) the remedy may not be impaired if to do so
would leave no satisfactory method of enforcing the contractual ob-
ligation; (3) a judgment is merely evidence of the obligation upon
which it is founded; (4) impairing the laws available to enforce thejudgment is tantamount to impairing the remedy of the contractual
obligation for which the judgment now stands; and (5) only in this
sense will the impairment of a judgment be prohibited by the con-
stitutional clause protecting contracts.
Scope of the Constitutional Prohibition
The constitutional prohibition against impairing the obligations
of contracts applies only to contracts in the true sense of the word.7
That is, the obligation must arise out of an agreement mutually as-
sented to by the parties. Therefore quasi-contracts, in which no
actual assent exists between the parties, are not protected by the
constitutional provision.8  Also, the provision applies only to
contracts in esse at the time the alleged impairing statute takes ef-
fect.9 The overriding purpose of the constitutional prohibition is to
free individuals from any fear of the state impairing an obligation
due from another by its enactment of a law which affects their
voluntary agreement.10
One obvious aspect of the constitutional provision is that it
prohibits the state from enacting any law which voids, discharges,
or partially releases a contractual obligation." Such a law would
amount to a direct impairment of the contract and is always pro-
hibited.
The more subtle aspect of the prohibition is that it encompasses
indirect as well as direct impairment. An indirect impairment results
5 State ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285 (1883).
6 Jones v. Union Oil Co., 218 Cal. 775, 25 P.2d 5 (1933).
7 Holland v. General Motors Corp., 75 F. Supp. 274 (W.D.N.Y. 1947),
aff'd 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887 (1948).
8 See State ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 288
(1883).
9 Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920).
10 Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 327 (1848).
11 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819); Brown
v. Ferdon, 5 Cal. 2d 226, 54 P.2d 712 (1936).
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from the enactment of a law which, while not affecting the terms
of the contract per se, substantially removes or abrogates a remedy
for enforcing the obligation of that contract.12 It is a well-recognized
principle that the remedy authorizing enforcement of an obligation is
part of that obligation,13 if it was available when the obligation
was originally created.' 4 But the obligation and the remedy are not
fully equated, for while a direct impairment of the obligation is
never allowed,15 an indirect impairment, by affecting the remedy,
is sometimes permissible.
This is the principle set forth in the case of Bronson v. Kinzie.'8
That case involved a mortgage executed with a power of sale
vested in the mortgagee. The law existing at that time made no
restrictions on the powers of sale obtained from such contracts. Sub-
sequent to this mortgage the legislature enacted a statute prohibit-
ing the sale of any property under such mortgages for less than two-
thirds of the value of the property and further providing for a re-
demption by the mortgagor within 1 year of the sale. In holding
that the statute impaired the obligation of the original mortgage con-
tract, the court said:
Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may be altered according to
the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obli-
gation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial
whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the con-
tract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the Constitution.17
12 Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1872); People ex rel.
Thorne v. Hayes, 4 Cal. 127 (1854).
'3 Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 552 (1866).
14 Garret & Sons v. City of Memphis, 5 F. 860, 874 (W.D. Tenn. 1881).
15 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819); Brown
v. Ferdon, 5 Cal. 2d 226, 54 P.2d 712 (1936).
16 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
17 Id. at 316; accord, Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1895); Edward v.
Kearzy, 96 U.S. 595 (1877); Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 461 (1860);
Lessee of Daniel Gantley v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 707 (1845); McCracken
v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
1, 92 (1823). Cf. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1872). In stating
the reasons for its holding, the Bronson court said: "If the laws of the state
passed afterwards had done nothing more than change the remedy upon con-
tracts of this description, they would be liable to no constitutional objection.
For, undoubtedly, a state may regulate at pleasure the modes of proceeding
in its courts in relation to past contracts as well as future. It may, for ex-
ample, shorten the period of time within which claims shall be barred by the
statute of limitations. It may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary
implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of neces-
sity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to exe-
cution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been con-
sidered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the remedy,
to be exercised or not by every sovereignty, according to its own views of
policy and humanity. It must reside in every state to enable it to secure its
citizens from unjust and harassing litigation, and to protect them in those
pursuits which are necessary to the existence and well-being of every com-
munity. And, although a new remedy may be deemed less convenient than
the old one, and may in some degree render the recovery of debts more tardy
and difficult, yet it will not follow that the law is unconstitutional." 42 U.S.
(1 How.) at 315-16.
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The court thus held that the remedy might be altered by the
state, provided that a substantial remedy is still available for one
party to enforce the obligations due from the other. When the state
has altered the remedy to the point that the obligation of the
contract cannot be enforced, that obligation is said to be impaired and
the Constitution is violated. Unfortunately the extent of remedial
alteration necessary to result in impairment is not clear and appears
to be largely within the discretion of the court.1 s
18 From an opinion denying rehearing in Welsh v. Cross, 146 Cal. 621,
633, 81 P. 229, 232 (1905), Beatty, C.J., distinguishes a United States Supreme
Court case and explains why an extension of the time period available for a
mortgagor to redeem his property impairs the obligation of the mortgage
contract, but the reduction of the interest he must pay during the redemption
period would not be such an impairment. For examples of subsequent alter-
ations in remedies held constitutional, see Security Say. Bank v. California,
263 U.S. 282 (1923) (changing escheat procedure for turning over unclaimed
bank deposits); Henley v. Myers, 215 U.S. 373 (1910) (changing procedure
for stock transfers); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907) (change in
procedure for suing stockholders of a corporation); Oshkosh Waterworks Co.
v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 (1903) (amendment of city charter imposing addi-
tional conditions on parties bringing suits against city); Wilson v. Standefer,
184 U.S. 399 (1902) (change in procedure for purchasers in default on con-
tracts); Red River Valley Bank v. Craig, 181 U.S. 548 (1901) (change in
mechanic's lien law); New Orleans C. & L.R.R. v. Louisiana ex rel. New
Orleans, 157 U.S. 219 (1895) (allowing for specific performance of a contract
without a jury trial); Hill v. Merchant's Ins. Co., 134 U.S. 515 (1890) (enlarg-
ing rights of judgment creditor where liability of debtor not increased);
Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U.S. 401 (1883) (binding creditors to reor-
ganization of state corporation after due notice given); Vance v. Vance, 108
U.S. 514 (1883) (requiring the recording of mortgages); Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51 (1883) (reducing interest rate due to a
purchaser of mortgage if property redeemed after sale); State ex rel. Folsom
v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880) (change in procedure for executing
judgments); Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69 (1877) (change in procedure for
proving evidence); Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168 (1877) (changing pro-
cedure for serving process); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877) (reducing
statute of limitations which still left a reasonable time in which to file suit);
Curtis v. Whitney, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 68 (1871) (changing requirements for
obtaining a tax deed); Crawford v. Branch Bank, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 279
(1849) (allowing bank to sue in its own name on notes made payable to its
cashier); Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831) (shorter
statute of limitations applied to land which used to be in another state prior
to boundary change); Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830)
'(requiring the recording of a deed to protect grantee from subsequent
purchaser).
For altered remedies held to be unconstitutional, see Bank of Minden v.
Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921) (change in creditors' rights to the proceeds of
debtors' life insurance policies); Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904)
(change in rights of mortgagee after taking possession of property); Fisk v.
Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885) (repeal of taxing statute disabling
the payment of agreed salary to city official); Virginia Coupon Cases (Poin-
dexter v. Greenhow), 114 U.S. 269, 298, 299 (1885) (repeal of law allowing
interest coupons from bonds to be used for payment of taxes); Memphis v.
United States, 97 U.S. 293 (1878) (repeal of authority to levy tax to satisfy
a judgment rendered on a contract); Wilmington & W.R.R. v. King, 91 U.S. 3
(1875) (allowing jury to disregard value of contract when value has been
stipulated by the parties).
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The holding of Bronson was approvingly followed quite early by
California, 9 and many subsequent decisions have held the Constitu-
tion violated when the alteration of a remedy had the effect of im-
pairing the obligation of a contract.
20
Having established that the constitutional provision extends to
protecting the remedy as part of the obligation, it will now be use-
ful to determine what is meant by "the remedy." While a layman
might think of his remedy for any wrong done to him as the right to
have a judgment entered in his favor, his true remedy consists of the
entire scope of legal process affording him the right to enforce his
claim-with or without the consent of the defendant. Remedies are
the judicial means by which an obligation is effectuated.21 Since a
judgment is a necessary step in effectuating an obligation, it is part
of the remedy; but as used throughout this discussion, the remedy con-
sists primarily of statutory provisions for the execution and satis-
faction of judgments. 22 As stated by one court: "A judgment ...
is merely the affirmation of a liability. The judgment .. leaves the
parties to pursue remedies which the law provides. '23
The Nature of a Judgment
While a judgment has been considered to be a "contract of rec-
ord '24 and a "quasi-contract," 25 it is not considered to be a contract in
the constitutional sense.26  Among other essentials of a contract,
there must be mutual assent among the parties who are to be bound
by the terms thereof.27 Not only does a judgment lack this mutual
assent, but the legal compulsion to abide by the judgment would
appear to be the antithesis of such assent.28
Blackstone's ancient argument29 that a man contracts with soci-
ety to obey its laws and court decisions when he partakes of society's
benefits has been highly and justly criticized.2 0 This "social con-
19 Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524, 548 (1852).
20 E.g., Rand v. Bossen, 27 Cal. 2d 61, 162 P.2d 457 (1945); Brown v.
Ferdon, 5 Cal. 2d 226, 54 P.2d 712 (1936); Morris v. Pacific Electric Ry., 2 Cal.
2d 764, 43 P.2d 276 (1935); People ex rel. Thorne v. Hayes, 4 Cal. 127 (1854);
Arques v. National Superior Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 763, 155 P.2d 643 (1945).
21 Commercial Centre Realty Co. v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 2d 121, 59 P.2d
978 (1936); see J. POMEROY, CODE REmEDiES § 2 (5th ed. 1929).
22 See generally CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 681-713Y.
23 San Luis Power & Water Co. v. Trujillo, 93 Colo. 385, 391, 26 P.2d 537,
540 (1933).
24 1 T. PARSONS, LAw OF CONTRACT 8 (9th ed. 1904).
25 1 W. ELLIOT, CONTRACTS § 2 (1913); W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 16
(1893); F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACT § 1 (1913).
26 Morley v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 146 U.S. 162 (1892); 1 H. BLACK,
JUDGMENTS §§ 8, 10 (2d ed. 1902).
27 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 3, 9 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 18
(3d ed. 1957).
28 1 H. BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 10 (2d ed. 1902). Black concedes that a
judgment by confession or default could be considered a contract, but the
former is based on the confession and the latter on the theory that the defend-
ant submits to whatever the court decides when he defaults.
29 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161.
30 1 BLACK, supra note 28, § 10.
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tract" theory might easily support the proposition that a judgment
rendered by a court is a contract, but the logical extension of this the-
ory would also support the conclusion that every tort is a contract.
This conclusion is reached by implying an agreement by man to com-
pensate his fellow man for any damage inflicted upon him. But
since the distinction between tort and contract is so well embedded
in our legal system, the premise giving rise to such a contradictory
extension must be fallacious. In any event, no case holding a judg-
ment to be a contract has based its decision on this theory.
A distinction will be drawn between judgments founded on torts
and those based on contracts. The reason for this distinction lies in
the fact that a judgment founded on a contract is nothing more than
the affirmation of a liability and the acknowledgment of an obligation
of one party in favor of another.31 It is merely the judicial deter-
mination and sanction of pre-existing debt, and not the creation of a
new debt.32 On the other hand, a judgment founded on tort cannot
evidence any pre-existing debt for the obvious reason that there was
none. And though it might be argued that such a judgment creates a
new and original obligation, as far as the constitutional issue is
concerned, it is the absence of any pre-existing debt that repre-
sents the critical distinction between judgments based on torts and
those founded on contracts.
This note proceeds on the premise that a judgment founded on a
contract is not a new debt, but rather evidence of the old one in a
higher form. Before establishing this proposition it is necessary to
dispose of the possible contention that, under the doctrine of merger,
a judgment creates a new debt resulting from its extinguishment
of the original cause of action.33 The only purpose, however, of
merging a cause of action into the judgment is to give effect to the
doctrine of res judicata. For it is the policy of the law to prevent
a man from twice being vexed for the same cause and to bestow some
degree of finality to litigation.34 The reasons for extinguishing the
original cause of action are to exhibit judicial finality granted to the
issues involved, to establish conclusive evidence of the liabilty,
and to preclude any further action ever being instituted on those par-
ticular issues.35
Except for the above policies underlying the doctrine of merger,
the contractual debt existing prior to the judgment is the same debt
after the judgment notwithstanding its absorption into it.36 Even
though the orginal cause of action may never again be the basis of a
claim between the parties encompassed by the judgment, it may aid in
the interpretation of that judgment.37 Courts often look to what a
judgment is founded upon in order to give proper effect to it. 38
31 Id. at §§ 1, 4.
32 See Oil Tool Exch., Inc. v. Schuh, 67 Cal. App. 2d 288, 153 P.2d 976
(1944). Notwithstanding their traditional usage, the terms "debt" and "obli-
gation" are used synonymously throughout this note.
33 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 47, comment a (1942).
34 Miller & Lux, Inc. v. James, 180 Cal. 38, 179 P. 174 (1919).
35 See 2 BLACK, supra note 28, § 674.
36 A. FREEMAN, JuDGMENTs § 546 (5th ed. 1925).
37 Id.
38 Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457 (1887).
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The doctrine of merger, then, does not preclude the theory that a
judgment is a change in the form rather than the substance of the
contractual obligation and is thereby still included within the con-
stitutional provision.
The United States Supreme Court's View
The Supreme Court of the United States seems to be well-settled
on whether a judgment is a contract in the constitutional sense. In
State ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans,39 the plaintiff was
awarded a judgment on a tort committed by the city. Although the
city was liable for the amount of the judgment, a statute prohibited
any levy against city property for the satisfaction of its debts. The
city therefore, had to rely on its taxing power to raise funds to pay
its judgments. Subsequent to this judgment, however, the state en-
acted a law restricting the power of the city to tax, and this restriction
disabled the city from paying plaintiff's judgment. As to whether
the new statute impaired the obligation of a contract under the Con-
stitution, the Court held that the term "contract" applied only to
agreements entered into with the mutual assent of both parties and
that a judgment was not such an agreement. The Court declared
that:
[T]he prohibition of the Federal Constitution was intended to
secure observance of good faith in the stipulation of the parties
against any state action. Where a transaction is not based upon any
assent of the parties, it cannot be said that any faith is pledged with
respect to it; and no case arises for the operation of the prohibition.40
The Court upheld the restriction of the taxing statute as consti-
tutional and found that it did not impair the obligation of any con-
tract in spite of the nugatory effect given the judgment. This case
has been cited as authority for the position that a judgment founded
in tort is not a contract under the Constitution.41
In the very next session, however, the Supreme Court had an
almost identical situation before it.4 2 Again a state legislature had
repealed a law allowing taxes to be assessed to satisfy judgments, but
in this case the judgment was founded on a contract rather than a
tort. In holding that the repeal was prohibited by the Constitution,
the Court distinguished State ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans
on the grounds that it involved a judgment founded on tort and
did not therefore involve the obligation on a contract in the constitu-
tional sense.43 Thus, the United States Supreme Court has differen-
tiated judgments founded on torts from those based on contracts. The
court has prohibited the impairment of a judgment only when it
was founded on an antecedent contract and when it was considered to
be evidence of that contract.44
Research has disclosed no case wherein the impairment of a
judgment founded on a tort has been prohibited in any manner by
39 109 U.S. 285 (1883).
40 Id. at 288.
41 1 BLACI, supra note 28, § 9.
42 State ex rel. Nelson v. Police Jury, 111 U.S. 716 (1884).
43 Id. at 720-21.
44 Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173 (1887); Walker v. Powers, 104 U.S. 245
(1881).
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the Supreme Court. This is consistent with the rationale that such ajudgment would not represent any obligation of contract in the
constitutional sense. This reasoning attains its logical conclusion in
Freeland v. Williams4 5 where the United States Supreme Court found
no constitutional objection to a state law declaring all judgments
founded on a specific tort to be null and void4 0--upholding what must
certainly be the pinnacle of impairments.
The California View
Having set forth the premises that (1) the remedy available for
enforcing a contractual obligation is part of that obligation, and (2)
that a judgment founded on a contract is merely evidence of that
contract in a higher form, an analysis of the California decisions
may be commenced.
In Jones v. Union Oil Co.47 the defendant had previously ob-
tained a judgment against one Hovley for breach of a contract.4 At
the time that the judgment was rendered a statute provided that
all judgments became automatic liens on the defendant's real prop-
erty within the county. Under this statute Union Oil had a lien on
Hovley's land. Subsequent to this judgment the statute was
amended to require an abstract to be filed in every county in which
the defendant had real property before any lien could arise on it.
Jones bought the land from Hovley after the amendment and brought
this action to clear title to the land. Jones claimed that he was
without notice of Union Oil's lien because Union Oil was now re-
quired to comply with the amended statute. The issue before the
court was whether this amendment could apply retroactively to
Union Oil's judgment.
In holding the amendment invalid as to the judgment lien on
Hovley's property, the court said that "a judgment is a contract as
contemplated by the Constitution" and impairment of it was pro-
hibited. It may be noted that it is this statement which has given
rise to California's apparent conflict with the holdings of the United
States Supreme Court set out above. An effort will now be made to
show that the court did not mean what it purported to say in the
quoted statement.
Jones cited only two cases to support its holding. One was
Miller v. Murphy49 which did not deal with a judgment as a contract
under the Constitution but held only that a judgment was included
in the term "contract" under a state code provision.50 Miller is there-
45 131 U.S. 405 (1889).
46 Id. at 413-16.
47 218 Cal. 775, 25 P.2d 5 (1933).
48 The fadt that the judgment was based on a contract does not appear
in the California Supreme Court opinion. But this fact is shown by the orig-
inal pleadings filed with the Superior Court for El Centro county in the case
of Union Oil Co. v. Hovley, case no. 10817, docket book 3, p. 76, line 8, June
16, 1926. The pertinent matter in the original pleadings may be found in a
letter from the clerk of El Centro Superior Court to the author, November
3, 1967, on file in the office of the Hastings Law Journal.
49 186 Cal. 344, 199 P. 525 (1921).
50 Id. at 347, 199 P. at 527, citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 438(2) (1872),
derived from Cal. Stats. 1860, ch. 314, § 5 at 299.
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fore distinguishable from the facts before the Jones court.
But Scarborough v. Dugan,51 the other authority cited by Jones,
did deal with a constitutional issue and might be interpreted as
supporting the Jones conclusion. In this case Scarborough brought an
action on an Ohio judgment rendered against Dugan in 1853. In
1855 California's 5-year statute of limitations for bringing actions on
foreign judgments was amended to read:
An action upon any judgment, contract, obligation, or liability, for
the payment of money or damages obtained, executed, or made out
of this State, can only be commenced within two years from the time
the action has accrued or shall accrue.52
The action on the Ohio judgment was brought in 1856, subsequent
to the amended statute, but prior to the expiration of the 5 years
allowed under the original statute.
It can be seen from the excerpt that the statute expressly dealt
with actions brought on judgments as well as those brought on con-
tracts; therefore, no question arose as to whether the judgment was
to be treated as a contract under the amendment. What did have to
be determined was whether the state could, by making the amend-
ment retroactive, deprive Scarborough of his right to bring an action
on the Ohio judgment. The court asked,
Can the Legislature, under the pretence or with the object of regu-
lating the remedy, deny all remedy, and thus destroy the contract?
for it is well settled that a judgment, in this sense of the Constitu-
tion, is a contract.53
The question now arises as to whether Scarborough was in fact
authority for the proposition that a "judgment is a contract as con-
templated by the Constitution" as held by the court in Jones. It is
suggested that Jones, in reaching this conclusion, either erred in
interpreting Scarborough or inadvertently misquoted it. To demon-
strate this, it is necessary to explore and analyze the means by which
Jones could have ferreted such a holding from the Scarborough
decision.
One means by which Jones could have construed Scarborough as
holding a judgment to be a contract would be by regarding the
Scarborough reference to "the contract" as being in fact a reference
to the Ohio judgment. But a more likely and certainly more logical
interpretation of the quotation is that "the contract" refers to the
original contract upon which the Ohio judgment was founded, rather
than to the judgment itself.
Second, and more probable, Jones may have considered that the
Scarborough court expressly held a judgment to be a contract in
the constitutional sense. This is erroneous, however, for what Scar-
borough actually said was "a judgment, in this sense of the Constitu-
tion, is a contract. '54 While Jones used almost the identical words
in its holding, they were used in a different order. By omitting or
repositioning the phrase "in this sense of the Constitution," the Scar-
borough quotation might be interpreted as holding a judgment to be
a contract. But the appositive substantially qualifies the statement.
51 10 Cal. 305 (1858).
52 Cal. Stats. 1855, ch. 66, § 1, at 75.
53 10 Cal. at 308.
54 Id.
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Evidently Jones de-emphasized this by failing to recognize the signifi-
cant effect it has on the sentence. In the lines immediately pre-
ceding the appositive, Scarborough referred to the Bronson v. Kin-
zie55 doctrine of protecting the remedy, and it is suggested that "in
this sense of the Constitution" referred to that doctrine. The Scar-
borough court simply meant that a judgment was a contract in the
sense that it evidenced a contract which could not constitutionally be
impaired by denying a remedy for its ultimate enforcement.6 Scar-
borough's chief concern was whether an amendment to an existing
remedy-the right to bring suit on a judgment within 5 years-
could apply retroactively; the finding of the judgment to be a con-
tract was ancillary to this main issue. It became necessary only be-
cause of the reduction of the original contract to a judgment in Ohio,
thus creating a need to encompass that judgment within the constitu-
tional provision. All that Scarborough may be accurately cited for
is that under limited circumstances a judgment will be considered a
contract in the constitutional sense. Those circumstances consist of
any legislation whereby a remedy is altered so as to result in a sub-
stantial impairment of the contractual obligation for which the judg-
ment now stands.
Unfortunately the Jones court failed to discuss any rationale for
its holding. The court merely made the statement and cited two
cases. Because of this, it is difficult to determine if Jones did or
did not misinterpret Scarborough. But since Scarborough set forth
its reasoning for its decision, it would be reasonable to assume that
the Jones court correctly understood and wholeheartedly concurred
in what Scarborough actually held,57 although greater precision
should have been employed when repeating it.
Scarborough was an excellent authority for the Jones case. Both
cases involved a statutory amendment which impaired the ability to
enforce a judgment existing prior to that amendment. The results of
the two cases were correct. Both recognized the right of the state to
alter the remedy, but each considered the particular alteration before
it to be too broad (viz., the legislature departed from the allowable
area of altering remedies and entered the constitutional sphere of
contract impairment).
Since it is conceded that the ultimate decision reached by Jones
is correct and should not be changed regardless of the court's inter-
pretation of Scarborough, one may doubt the noteworthiness of the
foregoing analysis. But "[t]he path is smooth that leadeth on to
danger,"58 and allowing the Jones statement to go unchecked "smooths
the path" for the type of error made in Grotheer v. Meyer Rosenberg,
Inc.59 There it was held, inter alia, that a judgment was a contract
55 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 315 (1843).
56 Among the cases citing Scarborough v. Dugan for this proposition are
Teralta Land & Water Co. v. Shaffer, 116 Cal. 518, 523, 48 P. 613, 614 (1897);
Houston v. McKenna, 22 Cal. 550, 554 (1863).
57 The Jones court recognized that an obligation included the remedy for
enforcing it and that the remedy could not be substantially impaired. 218
Cal. at 778, 25 P.2d at 6.
58 Shakespeare, Venus and Adonis, in G. KrrIGE, COMPLETE WoRxs or
SHAKESPEARE 1462, line 788 (Players ed. 1958).
59 11 Cal. App. 2d 268, 53 P.2d 996 (1936).
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irrespective of its being founded on a tort or contract.60
The Grotheer case involved a judgment awarded to the plaintiff
for a tort committed by the defendant. But before the plaintiff could
levy execution the defendant organized a private corporation and
transferred all of his assets to it. The plaintiff, claiming that the
alter ego doctrine applied, instituted proceedings to attach the prop-
erty then in the possession of the corporation.
In holding that the alter ego doctrine prohibited the defendant
from escaping payment of the judgment debt in such a fashion, the
court cited two cases.6 1 These cases, however, did not involve an
attempted avoidance of a judgment debt; they were brought on the
original contractual obligation and the fraudulent transfer of assets
took place prior to the filing of any action on the original contracts.
The authorities held that the alter ego doctrine protected creditors by
allowing attachment of the debtor's assets even after the fraudulent
transfer to a new, privately held corporation.
While the Grotheer court agreed with the decisions in the cited
cases, it also recognized that the debt owed to Grotheer arose from a
judgment founded on a tort. In order to bring the facts of the case un-
der the purview of the cited authorities, the court stated that this dis-
tinction did not alter the situation. To support this contention the
court relied on Jones v. Union Oil Co. for the premise that a judg-
ment is a contract,62 and Corpus Juris613 for the proposition that
this is so irrespective of the nature of the claim upon which the judg-
ment is founded. The court held that the original cause of action,
whether tort or contract, became merged with judgment.
The notion of merging a cause of action into the judgment has
been discussed earlier in this note and found to be true only for
certain purposes; the original cause of action may still exist when
necessary to give proper effect to the judgment. The Jones case
also has been discussed, with the conclusion that it does not stand
for the general proposition that a judgment is a contract. There
remains only the reference to Corpus Juris to support the statement
in Grotheer. But the encyclopedia text does not appear to corrobo-
rate the court's sweeping statement. What the encyclopedia does
verify is the court's conclusion that a judgment, regardless of being
founded on tort or contract, is a debt which the defendant is under an
obligation to pay.6 4 This proposal has been set forth earlier in this
60 Id. at 272-73, 53 P.2d at 998-99.
61 Stanford Hotel Co. v. Mischwind Co., 180 Cal448, 181 P. 780 (1919);
Mezlisch v. San Francisco Wool Sorting & Scouring Co., 213 Cal. 668, 6 P.2d
310 (1931).
62 The court also relied on Weaver v. San Francisco, 146 Cal. 728, 81 P.
119 (1905), and Gutta-Percha & Rubber Mfg. Co. v. City of Houston, 108 N.Y.
276, 15 N.E. 402 (1886). The former case dealt only with the finality of ajudgment and the effect of res judicata. The case did not discuss the ques-
tion of treating a judgment as a contract and therefore is not a valid author-
ity and will not be analyzed.
The Gutta case concerned itself with the question of treating a judgment
as a contract under a state code provision. It did not discuss nor was it
authority for treating a judgment as a contract in the constitutional sense.
63 33 C. J. Judgments § 9, at 1056.
64 Id.
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note6 5 and is not contested; to the contrary, it is supported and relied
upon.
It should be noted that the Grotheer case dealt with neither the
question of treating a judgment as a contract under the Constitution
nor under a state code provision. The only reason for finding a judg-
ment to be a contract was to relate the facts before it to those in
the cases it wished to cite. Since Grotheer involved a tort reduced
to a judgment debt, and the authorities involved debts due under
contracts, the court evidently deemed it necessary to find judgments,
even when based on torts, to be contracts. By equating judgments
and contracts, the debt owed Grotheer would be a contractual one
and the authorities would be in point.
This reasoning, however, would be necessary if the alter ego
doctrine were restricted to protecting contractual debts only; but
such is not the case, for the doctrine is employed whenever necessary
to prevent an unjust or inequitable result.0 6 It extends to all legal
debts and protects them by regarding the corporation as the "other
self" of its dominant stockholder and liable for his obligations.6 7
The Grotheer court over-complicated its situation. All that was
necessary was a finding that a judgment was a debt or obligation
and as such was protected under the alter ego doctrine. Not only
was it unnecessary to find that a judgment based on a tort was a
contract, but such a holding would be in direct conflict with the
United States Supreme Court's decision that judgments founded on
torts are not contracts under the Constitution.
To reach its conclusion, Grotheer simply began with a question-
able premise from the Jones case, unjustifiably extended it to in-
clude judgments based on torts, and then applied it to a distinguish-
able set of circumstances.
Conclusion
While statements of some California courts that judgments are
contracts appear to be in conflict with decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, it is felt that no such conflict actually exists.
There is no California decision which, on the same facts, the United
States Supreme Court would have decided differently. It is suggested
that Califonia always has treated and will continue to treat a judg-
ment as a contract under the Constitution only when the judgment
is founded on a contract and one party is alleging that a state statute
has substantially hindered his ability to enforce the obligation now
evidenced by the judgment. This is the only situation under which
either the United States or the California Supreme Courts have
held a judgment to be a contract in the constitutional sense.
But in order to resolve the apparent conflict created by Jones v.
Union Oil Co., it is further suggested that the constitutional provision
65 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
66 Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 P. 673 (1921); Erkenbrecher v.
Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 P. 641 (1921).
67 Wenban Estate, Inc. v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 695-98, 227 P. 723, 731-32
(1924).
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prohibiting the "impairment of the obligations of contracts" be con-
strued to emphasize the word "obligation" rather than "contract."
The word "contract" should merely be interpreted as describing the
only type of obligation which is to be protected.
The question should not be whether a judgment is a contract,
but whether it is an obligation or debt. Once the court has estab-
lished that a judgment is an obligation, it should then ascertain
whether the obligation (i.e. judgment) arose out of an action on a true
contract. If so, the Constitution would prohibit the impairment of
the judgment, for the judgment is merely evidence of the contractual
debt. But if the judgment arose from an action on an implied con-
tract or tort, the constitutional provision would not be applicable
because the judgment could not be said to represent a contractual ob-
ligation as contemplated by the Constitution.
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